Was any sort of control mechanism wielded over its taxation policy? Historians have tended to answer these questions in terms of state construction. A simplistic dichotomy between parliamentary states and absolutist states has led many historians to rule out the very possibility of any absolutist state worrying about fiscal transparency. In theory an absolutist state had no curb, control or institutional restriction whatsoever to the enforcement of its taxation policy.
Precisely because of this unlimited capacity of fiscal action it had no need either to explain its taxation policy to taxpayers. More recently it has been argued that the will of a state alone was not enough in itself to bring in significant tax changes.
As the English example shows, a certain consensus between state and taxpayers about the advantage of any fiscal change, whether in terms of protection or opportunities, was essential. Today it is argued that the absolutist state would seek consensus only with the revenue-collecting middle men.
This would be a limited consensus, involving pacts with specific groups whether public institutions or private groups. An absolutist state, therefore, would still not need to communicate its taxation policy changes to taxpayers themselves. Since there was no type of communication or taxpayer involvement in the taxation policy, the consequence would be that taxpayers of absolutist states would systematically oppose any change in the taxation policy.
Absence of fiscal transparency, therefore, was a sine qua non of understanding taxation policy in absolutist states. Did the Spanish state have any type of concern or sensitivity about the reaction of its taxpayers? In other words, did the Spanish absolutist state practice any type of fiscal transparency? In November the Spanish government decreed a tax increase to defray the war that broke out against Great Britain in June of the same year.
Artola regarded this as easy to understand. After all, we are dealing here with an absolute state that can pursue the arbitrary policy it wishes; i.
Artola undoubtedly sees this despotic tax hike as a clear example of arbitrariness underpinned by the absolutist model. The aim of this article is precisely to plumb the truth of this hypothesis, i. The discovery that absolute states in fact had more difficulty than parliamentary states in changing their taxation policy has opened up an interesting debate about why precisely the non-absolutist states like Great Britain or the Netherlands were able to modify and mobilise their taxation resources far more successfully.
The differences between states seem to reside above all in the levels of political and economic elites, both local and national. To start with there is now a certain consensus that taxation was not the most efficient warfare-financing method in the eighteenth century. As Richard Bonney argues, past experience had taught the French government but any other European state might have plausibly learnt the same lesson , that the new taxes would not rake in enough money quick enough to finance a war.
The warfare-financing tax hike decreed by Charles III cannot be seen as an isolated and almost automatic measure. To understand its real nature it needs to be studied in the historical context in which it was effectively agreed and enforced. Neither can this tax hike be written off as a convenient measure. Consideration has to be given to such factors as the real revenue-raising calculations of the authorities, which we can check against its enforcement, its efficacy in raising this calculated sum, the speed and the methods put into practice.
The fact that there was an order to raise tax rates, in other words, cannot stand alone as an explanation of that taxation policy. We need also to factor in the design of the taxation change, how this tax hike was actually enforced and what were the consequences of the measure. In the order went out for a Junta de Medios Resources Board to be set up, with the remit of proposing resources for tackling the war with Great Britain, declared in mid-June ; the Junta duly came up with ten resources or measures.
Significantly, another Junta de Medios held in late June did not even mention tax increases. Although the war began in June , the government did not give the tax-hike order until mid-November of this year.
This delay does not seem logical in the circumstances, especially in view of the fact the revenue was likely to take some time to filter through the system. This delay contrasts sharply with the extraordinary legislative fleet-footedness shown by the opposing sovereign George III, who, at the very moment of declaring war ordered increases in a host of taxes.
To this end all military effort had concentrated on building up a huge navy to attack the British Isles directly together with the French fleet, followed by an invasion and a rapid end to proceedings.
Up to that time the war-financing method had been the traditional one of rifling all deposits of public funds right round the country. In theory, neither the monarch nor his government was bound to ask any other institution to vouchsafe this decision or negotiate its enforcement. For whatever reason, and despite the delay, the government decided to act with notable precautions, to forestall a taxpayer backlash, and bent over backwards to soften the impact of this tax hike.
In a calculated and systematic way he continually resorted to a justificatory rhetoric to back up his decision and muster grassroots support and legitimacy. The very decree that imposed the one-third hike in Rentas Provinciales was a notable exercise of political justification, based on overriding arguments of pressing needs, justice and fairness.
Nonetheless, the arguments used to take on a special significance if we bear in mind the manner in which the tax hike was arranged and enforced. The principle of taxes only as a last-ditch effort was therefore made explicit right from the word go.
The sequence here is crucial. It is in this characteristic trait that the Spanish government stands out from other European countries, where raising taxes was the first thing done after declaring war because state creditworthiness was guaranteed both for attracting funds and backing up the issue of public debt.
For a start the tax was given a time limit; it would be enforced only during This at least was the interpretation made by the Archbishop of Granada when, after the end of the war, he weighed up the definitive revocation of a tax that had been renewed for yearly terms since late In an equally paternalistic tone he opined that revocation of the Extraordinaria was a show of.
Fiscal inequality had been one of the main gripes of the proyectistas and politicians of the time in their demands for tax reforms. These authors tended to cite the Rentas Provinciales as the most extreme example of this lopsidedness, so the principle of taxation fairness was almost bound de rigor to pop up in the decree. Secondly, it helped to justify the tax to Castilian taxpayers.
Despite this political decision, however, the nationwide extension of the scope of this tax was not accompanied by a new nationwide collection arrangement. This oversight led to grave inequalities and problems that the state had to solve on a seat-of-the-pants basis. In all likelihood the paternalist rhetoric surrounding this tax-rise sought to emphasise its justice and fairness. As it later transpired, the government in fact feared that this new tax would end up strengthening non-state-controlled revenue collection methods, affecting the poorest taxpayers despite the spirit of the law.
Once more the paternalist spirit shines through and the state allowed the towns to dip into the surplus funds of Propios y Arbitrios local land revenue in the local coffers. Nonetheless, there were presumably more reasons than merely a paternalist outlook urging the state to authorise use of these local resources for payment of this tax. Prior to absolute rule, a king of France worked with the Estates. He was still a powerful ruler but in one sense he shared his authority with them.
When this system broke down, a country could descend into civil war. He had access to a standing royal army that was loyal only to him. A career in the military appeared to be one worth pursuing for someone with a noble background. Time Period of Absolutism. What were the main issues in the struggle between king and Parliament in 17th century England, and how were they resolved?
The main issue was a disagreement between the king and Parliament about who had ultimate political power. Louis XIV. A theory of government written by Englishman John Locke which posits that government authority was both contractual and conditional; therefore, if a government has abused its given authority, society had the right to dissolve it and create another.
Important politicians such as Cardinal Richilieu were staunch supporters of absolutism. Prior to absolute rule, a king of France worked with the Estates.
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